The captain was blamed - the enquiry described the cause as "an error in airmanship"
    on his part and his part alone, and because of this all encompassing conclusion,
    the survivors lost compensation and many questions that could have been asked, were
    not - or at least not as rigorously as they might have been.
The Aviation Ministry  having delayed and prevaricated for two years were suddenly
    very swift to improve the regulations and enforcement once the dust settled. It was
    an incredibly convenient verdict and perhaps some breathed a huge sigh of relief.
Nothing was illegal. Nothing was reckless.  Luck should not play a part in aviation,
    but occasionally it does.  In hindsight, actions may have been highly inadvisable,
    based on today's procedures, but our current attitude only came about from experience,
    and that was  formed in part by accidents like this.  Perhaps the best guess is that
    a combination of the forecast, the local deterioration in weather, a conscientious
    crew trying to get their passengers home, lack of working ground navigation aids
    and pressure from management to operate the service on the limit of prudence came
    together in one fateful moment to put a loaded passenger aircraft headlong into a
    hillside.
The modern attitude is to say it was an accident waiting to happen - the opposing
    view is that it had been done thousands of times before without any trouble, and
    this was a tragic case of that fatal pyramid of circumstances - everything going
    wrong at once.  
However this leaves a question we are unable to answer - and one that perhaps should
    have been answered by the enquiry.  
Why were loaded passenger planes even attempting to use Portsmouth or any other airfield
    in the conditions known to exist, when fundamental issues regarding safety and navigation
    facilities had not been resolved and had been sidelined by the Ministry of Aviation
    while they dealt with bureaucratic matters , despite acknowledgement and full awareness
    of the potential for a major disaster.
That was never satisfactorily answered - and yet the same Ministry were ready to
    blame the pilot when the reason for, if not the cause of, the accident could not
    be formally determined.
While the Ministry were too busy with operator licensing to follow up a known and
    urgent safety issue, a small independent airline , no doubt trying to juggle costs,
    revenue and passenger convenience were trying to land a plane full of delayed holiday
    makers at a fogbound airport owned by a local authority where the operator had paid
    for a new passenger terminal yet the Council couldn't find the funds for a basic
    two way radio set, let alone ground approach radar. Perhaps that is the essence of
    the tragedy.
Maybe other information that might point the finger towards a different conclusion
    was never made public by those who feared jeopardising their career.  Perhaps the
    crew were overwhelmed by some massive problem, or they may just have made a mistake.You
    will have to make up your mind, because the physical evidence died with the crew
    on that foggy hillside. You may wonder if some public employees were secretly relieved
    that it had.
It is perhaps fitting to quote the RAF Manual of Flight Safety AP3207 Chapter 8.
"Only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew
    be found negligent".
You decide.